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Interviewee:  EMIL SALIM 
Interviewer:  Nancy Chng 
Date:   18 November 2014 
Location:  Jakarta, Indonesia 
 
 
0:00:19 
Nancy 
 
Pak Emil Salim, thank you for talking with us this morning. You have served the 
country in several important capacities. I would like very much to hear about 
your days in the 1940s, when you were inspired to fight for the country’s 
independence.  
 
0:00:34 
Emil 
 
First, why to fight? Why to join the Freedom’s Movement? I was in a Dutch 
school, together with Dutch. But it was a privilege for me to be in a Dutch school. 
So, I have my Dutch friends. We were in elementary school, young. We played 
together, and fought together, and so on. But after playing, when you entered the 
clubhouse, then suddenly, all the white people, white-coloured people, were free 
to enter, but I myself could not. When I asked why, I said, “These are my friends.” 
(They told me) “But you are brown, you are coloured.” I said, “What’s wrong with 
my colour?” They said, “Well, you’re not white.” Then suddenly, I noticed that I’m 
not equal to the white people, so I could not enter the clubhouse. I could not 
drink together. You can play together outside, but you cannot enter inside the 
clubhouse. 
 
So, then I realised, there’s something different between me and the white people.  
I asked my father, “What is wrong? Why am I not allowed to enter the 
clubhouse?” He said, “Because we are not Indonesians.” Indonesia was not 
known at that time. I’m talking about ’36, ’37, 1937, ’38. You are nobody, you 
don’t have a country, and you don’t have a nation. You’re nobody. You’re an 
inlander it’s called, son of the land, but (you do) not own the land. So, because 
you’re brown, your colour is brown.  There I feel injustice. But then my father 
told me, “Your colour must be brown, but your brain power is not. So show in the 
class, that in spite of the colour of your skin, you are smarter than the others”. 
That pushed me very hard to become a kind of a champion in the class.  
 
Then I pushed writing articles. When it was chosen, and when it was read in 
front of the class, and then my name was mentioned, then I feel, “Look, I’m 
brown, but not my brain.” 
  
So, when the independence broke out, you feel relieved. Now I am somebody. 
From nobody to become somebody. So, it was a kind of finding your identity.  
You are somebody in the world, you’re not a second-class citizen. That drove 
me… the spirit, the fighting spirit. When the war was over, and we won 
independence, and Soekarno returned to Jakarta in 1950. 
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By ’51 I graduated from high school, and the first thing I did was go to the 
Economics faculty. When I then graduated from the Faculty, and I was assistant 
to Professor Sumitro. When I was chosen to be, elected to be, have the chance to 
get the scholarship from Ford Foundation to study in Berkeley, I grabbed it and 
agreed. It was called the Indonesianisation Programme by Sumitro, and the head 
of this group was Widjojo. Every Friday, we, (no) every Saturday, we had a 
discussion.  All the... we are ten of us, the Berkeley students. There was Ali 
Wardhana, Sumarlin and so on.  And the discussion was like this: Suppose we 
have a chance to build the country, how will you build, what will you do in 
building the country? How do you plan the development of Indonesia? 
 
0:04:21 
So, you have already a kind of a dream developed in the Berkeley period at that 
time. Strangely enough, later, when we returned, when we were teaching, and 
the New Order came, then we were teaching, the five of us, at the Army School. 
Widjojo, Sadli, Subroto, Ali Wardhana and myself. 
 
After teaching in the evening, you have dinner together with these big army 
leaders. Generals, colonels and so on. After dinner, discussion is important. So, 
it’s free. Suharto, the head of the school, Seskoad, it’s called, in this building, “I am 
the boss, and I assure you there is no censorship. So, you are free to talk. There’s 
nothing that will record you, you are free to talk. Anything.” So, the army people 
asked questions… They asked very sharp questions. Questions that were never 
raised outside, in the public, because it was very difficult. Sensitive, straight 
(questions). How is the country now? What is your assessment? Are we on the 
right track? Are we going the right direction? How will Indonesia be twenty 
years from now? What is unique? What is wrong? What is… Where are the 
difficulties?  
If we follow the course of action right now, where will, what will Indonesia be for 
the next fifteen, twenty years? And that reminds us of the discussion in Berkeley. 
  
0:06:03 
The difference is, when we were in Berkeley, we discussed theoretically, based 
on your readings, and so on. But when you are in the army school, you have to 
take into account the theory with the conditions as it exists. They bring in today’s 
reality, and we brought to them the future orientation. There it, somehow it 
meets. In the future, our main theme is we must put the economic house in order 
first. And then somehow, Suharto came to Bandung, and we were invited to see 
him personally. So, we met him, and there we found out that many things that we 
proposed, he agreed, he agreed… and in his quiet way. But we also know that he 
is a man of… practical man, very rational, sharp, fast, his perception ability is 
very sharp, very fast. Then he asked to assist him as Ketua Presidium.  
 
0:07:15 
Nancy 
 
So, you had to focus on economics.  
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0:07:16 
Emil 
 
Yes, we had to focus on economics. Widjojo was economic affairs, assisting 
Sudjono Humardani, and we were under Sudjono Humardani. 
 
0:07:25 
Nancy 
 
He’s a FINEC (Financial Economics) guy, he’s always finances, and economy.  
 
0:07:28 
Emil 
 
He’s a good friend of Suharto. He’s very close. But important(ly) is, he doesn’t 
understand economics. We were able to push him aside, so that Widjojo could go 
straight… So, the key is to show to the President that, “Look, we know more than 
him.” To show in a way, the language of economics that he doesn’t understand. 
Direct access is very important. If you have (a blockage) it is very difficult. 
Sudjono becomes sidelined, and Widjojo becomes the ear of the President, got 
the ear of the President.  
 
0:08:06 
Nancy 
 
And personally, Suharto liked… 
 
0:08:09 
Emil 
 
…liked Widjojo.  
 
0:08:10 
Nancy 
 
Very Javanese style. He knew how to approach him, unlike Pak Emil…. (Laugh) 
who is non-Javanese.  
 
0:08:18 
Emil 
 
I have learned my lesson at that time. We had a meeting, so the five of us and 
Widjojo, and then came the idea of how to overcome the crisis of rice. But then 
came the idea from one of the officers of the army to have artificial rice. I smelled 
something…. This is not right. To build a country based on artificial rice with so 
many people, and so with this sophisticated equipment. I was at the time very 
young, very naïve. I jumped and said, “It’s nonsense. This is not right, Mr 
President.” 
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0:09:00 
Nancy 
 
In front of Suharto? 
 
0:09:01 
Emil 
 
In front of Suharto, like a Sumatran, like… “This is not right. This is… that is 
cheating. Let’s go back to normal rice production through rice production. Have a 
firm rice production programme, and not this nonsense.” Along that line… 
Everybody was shocked, of course. 
 
0:09:21 
Nancy 
 
The room was quiet? The room was quiet after you spoke? Nobody said 
anything? 
 
0:09:26 
Emil 
 
No, the room was quiet and Suharto (was) also quiet. Anyhow, the meeting (was 
adjourned) to think (it) over. Decision was not taken. Usually in Indonesia, when 
the decision is not taken and (the meeting is adjourned to) think (it) over, it 
means (it is) rejected. So, I was happy. But outside, Widjojo told me, “Suharto is 
Javanese, you know?” “Yes”, I said. So, I was then told by Widjojo that the way of 
talking is - how to get things through without hurting feelings. There is this style 
– stick to your principle, but the way you express it is very important. So that you 
don’t, because of the way it’s expressed is controversial, there are good ideas 
being rejected. So how to build, package it in the right way.  
 
0:10:25 
Since then I have learned my lessons and… to become Javanese. But important 
(thing) is, Suharto knew that I am not Javanese. The others are Javanese. So 
sometimes, when we are discussing, and it becomes intimate, they speak 
Javanese. I don’t understand. Then Suharto realised that and then he apologised 
and... But every time when I meet him officially as a Minister, after our talk, then 
he asked me to drink, and so on and then he gave me lectures on the Javanese 
culture. The principle of menang tanpa ngasorake – victory without defeating, 
enrichment without materialism and rich without material. These kind of 
Javanese (sayings). He gave me a book – the Butir-Butir Budaya Jawa (Grains of 
Javanese Culture), and so on. Every time when I go there after official 
(engagements), the business is over, then we talk. We talk Javanese. He taught 
me the Javanese culture, which is fortunate because then I knew what his weak 
side is, what his strong side is, so how to come into his point then... and that was 
helpful. Because after I became Transport Minister, suddenly I was, there was a 
change in the Cabinet. I was invited to be, early in the morning with him on a 
boat trip. We took a boat trip to the harbour of Tanjong Priok, the dirty and the 
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Ciliwung, mouth of Ciliwung, polluted, very polluted. So, we went there, the two 
of us and so… and he showed me… “Look,” he said, “It’s very dirty.” “Yes, it’s very 
dirty.” I didn’t understand why he took me there. It was early in the morning. 
Then he said… and just… “It was ’78, 1978, so we had just started ten years (of) 
development. ’68-’78, and now it’s dirty like this. Can you imagine what (will) 
happen in year 2000, if we go on like this? How will Tanjong Priok look? How 
will this river look?” He was very excited. Then suddenly he said, “We must avoid 
this.” “Yes, Mr President.” “That’s why I ask you to become Minister of 
Environment.”  I was shocked. I said, “Me?” He said, “Yes.” (I said,) “I’m an 
Economist, I don’t know about Ecology, honestly Mr President.” “Pak ‘Harto,” I 
called him Pak ‘Harto… He said, “Well, economy and ecology are the same. 
Economy is the household of human-beings; ecology is the household of nature. 
It’s households. You know the household of human-beings, now household of 
nature. Get this - economy, ecology, merge it into one.” “Ecology, economy,” he 
said.  
 
0:13:46 
“Second, how can we develop without creating dirt? Pembagunan tanpa merusak 
- Development without destroying. So that by the year 2000, we must not get like 
this”, he said. “Good luck”, he said. “Congratulations, good luck.” So, I was really 
shocked. “My god,” I said, “What is environment?” Anyhow, he trusted me. But 
why is this meeting important? Because I have convinced to him, I have 
confessed to him that I don’t understand ecology… because later, when I faced a 
crisis, a conflict, because one of the companies wanted to develop a cement 
factory in a karst mountain in Gombong. Karst is a kind of a sponge for rainfall, 
so that it absorbs… in water, underneath… so ground water, river. So it is very 
important. But karst is also an ingredient for cement. 
 
0:14:51 
Nancy 
 
So, they will take that, they will be removing that mountain. 
 
0:14:54 
Emil 
 
Mountain… to build a cement factory in Gombong. It was endorsed by a 
(Suharto’s) family. So, I went to him and said, “Mr President, there is this karst.  
Well, this karst is a sponge that absorbs rainfall, and therefore there’s a lake on 
the beach.” “Yes, I know,” he said. “And there’s an underground river to Gunung 
Kidul.” “Yes,” he knows that also. “And Gunung Kidul is very dirt(y) and dry, that 
needs ground water.” “Yes,” he said. “And therefore, it’s important.” “Yes,” he 
said, not knowing what I wanted (to say) … “Well, Mr President, Pak ‘Harto, Pak, I 
have a problem.” “What?” “People want to build a cement factory over there.” 
“Who?” “Your family.” “It’s impossible,” he said. “But it is still…” I brought the 
document signed by one of his family. So… He looked at it, and he said, “Tell her 
that I don’t want that, I reject this. Tell her that it’s my order.” So, it was rejected.  
 
  6 
 
So, I went to the member of his family, “Pak ‘Harto asked me to inform you that 
it’s impossible.” Well, the answer that I got was very interesting: “I thought I was 
helping development of having investment in there. But if it is against 
environment, please follow.” He called me “Om, uncle, follow… we don’t want to 
be... that you will be in jeopardy.” So, that friendship, that kind of friendship was 
built between environment and development. So, any time I have a difficulty, I 
always reminded (Suharto), “I don’t know environment, I have warned you. But 
now I have this problem, I need you.” Something like that. That was most helpful 
in conflicts that I faced with those against environment.  
 
0:16:52 
Nancy 
 
But leadership, or good leadership also entails listening to good advice. But at 
some point, Suharto stopped listening to the Berkeley mafia, or to good advice. 
 
0:17:03 
Emil 
 
Why? I noticed at that time that children become… 
 
0:17:08 
Nancy 
 
Powerful. 
 
0:17:09 
Emil 
 
Children become grown up. One soft point that Pak ‘Harto has is his children. He 
loves his children very much. Tommy for instance, is one of his darlings. Why? 
Tommy liked to race in a race boat, race car. He had an accident. He broke his… 
So he has here and something here (Point to his forehead), and it was broken 
such that you can see the brain. He was brought to the hospital. The doctor gives 
up. They gave up, it’s impossible to… 
 
0:17:49 
Nancy 
 
To save.  
 
0:17:49 
Emil 
 
Yes. But here, I see the power of faith of Pak ‘Harto and Ibu. They asked to be left 
alone with him, with Tommy, in the room, in the Pertamina Rumah Sakit 
(Hospital).  
 
0:18:07 
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Nancy 
 
The hospital. 
 
0:18:09 
Emil 
 
The hospital. There, later I’m told, they were praying… the two of them only. 
Later I’m told that Tommy felt he was walking to a dark room, suddenly he heard 
the voice of his father, of his parents. 
 
0:18:34 
Nancy 
 
Calling him?  
 
0:18:35 
Emil 
 
Calling him. So, he returned, and that was the possibility for getting to be back 
again. Relieved. But imagine, yes? A parent that saw your child dying and 
suddenly living again. How is the relationship, of intensive love? 
 
0:18:59 
Nancy 
 
And that’s why he gave Tommy a lot of concessions. The Mobil Nasional… the 
clove business, and it created a lot of resentment, and the economists, economic 
ministers, people who were his close advisers could not say anything to dissuade 
Suharto from doing this sort of unfair practices? 
 
0:19:28 
Emil 
 
If a leader becomes long and too much in power, and everybody knows that his 
future, the future of you is very dependent on him, and he becomes a leader that 
is powerful for quite a long time, more and more in power, then you have the 
inclination just to give in, in whatever is being asked. So, the intention, the need 
to be against, will be very weak.  
 
0:20:02 
Nancy 
 
It will be more difficult. 
 
0:20:03 
Emil 
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More difficult, because you know that next year he will still be in power, five 
years from now, he will be in power and so on. He has been in power for thirty 
years. So, you build an apparatus which is a “yes man” apparatus. 
 
0:20:18 
Nancy 
 
In your overall assessment of Suharto as a leader, how do you describe him? 
 
0:20:24 
Emil 
 
One, he is a firm leader. He called always for the maintenance of the objective. 
Once he said, “I want X, all of us must focus on X,” and he does not deviate from it. 
One is the connection between Sabang and Merauke in Indonesia. “We must 
create one nation in order that I can, I as in the President in Jakarta can 
communicate with Sabang and Merauke with Jakarta, to assure one nation.” So, 
we built a satellite that transformed the communication links that can 
communicate (between) Sabang and Merauke. But the risk involved like this 
satellite, the risk is there. Nobody is doing that except Canada and the United 
State. Even if we don’t have the technology, so we have to borrow the technology, 
and if it’s costly. It is still his decision, with the risk. It may fail, because 
something may happen in the end. There’s no experience, no knowledge, yet he 
is firm. Maintenance of the objective.  
 
0:21:27 
Nancy 
 
In his later years, did you get disillusioned with his leadership? 
 
0:21:30 
Emil 
 
No, I see it like this actually. After thirty years, a new generation grew up, a new 
time, a new era, and a new era demanded a new, different leadership. So, he does 
not fit in this new time horizon. Thirty years is very long. From ‘70s… from ’68 
till ’98. Thirty years is too long. (There was) a generation change. I myself don’t 
understand the young generation anymore. I feel that the time has actually come 
in ’93. In ’93, I was helping him. ’68 till ’93. It’s twenty-five years, so twenty-five 
years together with Suharto, we have a close relationship. He called me and said, 
“This time, I’m not asking you (to be) in the next Cabinet.” 
 
Frankly speaking, I was relieved. After so many years since ’78-’93, fifteen years 
in the environment, you become dull, you become… your whole energy is already 
squeezed. Your imagination, your creative power is already squeezed.  
 
0:22:54 
Nancy 
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No stimulation? 
 
0:22:55 
Emil 
 
No… you don’t have ideas anymore. You think as usual, business as usual. So, 
frankly, I was relieved. “Mr President,” I said, “I am very relieved that I’m not (in 
the next Cabinet) because I have been helping you for twenty-five years and it 
has become a routine, and the routine becomes dull. You don’t have creativity, 
you feel something in you, any challenge that you face you don’t know anymore, 
how to face (them). The new challenges that come up, you are not equipped, 
because you are trained in the previous challenges.” I was speaking about myself. 
He was quiet, and then he said, “Yes, in a way, I feel the same.” “Oh, my god,” I 
said. Then he said, “Ibu (Suharto’s wife) had already asked him also to resign. I’m 
already too long (in power). You (have served) twenty-five years and I am sixty 
years old. We have been too long here.” 
 
0:23:54 
Nancy 
 
But don’t you feel that when people are in power too long, it is harder for them to 
relinquish power? 
 
0:23:58 
Emil 
 
Yes.  
 
0:23:59 
Nancy 
 
They don’t know how or when to stop? 
 
0:24:02 
Emil 
 
It’s the environment... when we talk like this… intensely, he reasoned, “Yes, I also 
want to leave, I think.” He said, “Ibu,” his wife also wants him to leave…. I will say 
that. I was also a member of the top of the Golkar [Party]… top. There is the 
Dewan Pertimbangan… here is the executive... and here you have the board, 
where the ministers are there, and he is chairing. We have this meeting there. He 
was telling, in the meeting, “I think the time has come that also I resigned,” he 
said. In that meeting, in 1993, and… “Please prepare.”  In a way he was asking 
who we think could be the next… and so on… He was asking the leadership, 
Harmoko was the Chairman... to then find out… “Harmoko,” he said, before the 
decision is taken that he withdraws, can he give him the opportunity to have a 
survey on how the public feeling is, the reaction (to him resigning).” He said, 
“Okay, alright.” Six months later, we had another meeting to listen to the survey 
results. The survey results said that eighty-six percent was against him to resign 
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and want him to continue. So, “Mr President,” Harmoko said, “from the Golkar 
point of view, it’s not wise if you withdraw, retreat.” So, in a way, it’s expected 
that he continues.  
 
So, what is my point? My point is the surroundings, the political leaders around 
him, the family, the business leaders, all are pushing him to go on. But I feel, 
personally he himself felt the time had come to stop. Why did the business 
leaders and the political leaders and the family want to push him on? Because 
they have an interest in him. Harmoko is still Chairman because of him. Without 
him, he is nothing. The business people around him, Bob Hasan and so on, (were 
around) because of him.  
 
0:26:18 
Nancy 
 
My final question for you is: How about the new Indonesia under Jokowi. Do you 
need a powerful leader like Suharto again?  
 
0:26:27 
Emil 
 
We have past phases of leadership, which I think Indonesia needs. You need a 
strong leader like Suharto during that period. But after that period, especially the 
2000s, you need a different type of leader. SBY (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) 
was a leader for the transition, for the transition from the Suharto period to the 
new one, to the democratic one. But filling democracy, I think Jokowi is [at] the 
right time, and I’m hopeful that he can bring (democracy), because he is 
democratic, he is from the bottom (masses). He is smart, yes, and he is not 
corrupt, that’s the key. He has no links with the big business. These are the 
criteria for the right leader for Indonesia in the future. I hope that he will stay 
that way. I hope that the business, the mafia groups could not control him.  
 
0:27:29 
Nancy 
 
Thank you very much Pak Emil. It was a very good interview with you. 
 
0:27:33 
Emil 
 
Thank you. 
 
0:27:34 
Nancy 
 
It was a very good interview with you. 
